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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
both sides, so that even the prosecution would not be barred from
disregarding the judgment and filing a new indictment.2 4
It is submitted that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure 25 requiring a jury where a question of fact is present should
be amended. Furthermore, an express authorization by the legis-
lature for the court to proceed without a jury would seem helpful.*
M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW - CONVICTION OF
HIGHER OFFENSE AFTER REVERSAL OF CONVICTION OF LOWER
OFFENSE HELD DOUBLE JEoPARY.-Defendant was indicted in the
District of Columbia for first degree felony murder 1 but was con-
victed of second degree murder.2  The verdict was silent as to the
greater offense. On appeal this conviction was reversed for lack of
evidence, but on remand, petitioner was tried again .and convicted of
first degree murder. The Supreme Court of the United States, re-
versing this conviction, held that conviction of a lesser degree of the
crime under an indictment for a higher degree was an acquittal of the
higher degree and thus further trial for the latter was double jeopardy,
a violation of the fifth amendment. Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184 (1957).
At common law, a second trial for the same offense was pro-
hibited whether the former trial resulted in an acquittal or a con-
24 For example, D is indicted, waives his right of jury trial, Znd is acquitted
by the court alone. The waiver is defective because not "signed by the defen-
dant in person in open court." (N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.) D is constitutionally
entitled to trial by jury and the court was without power to decide a case alone
unless there has been a waiver as prescribed by law. Therefore, the trial held
was a nullity and a new indictment is still possible.
25 See note 19 mspra.
* [Editor's Note] The recent case of Scott v. McCaffrey, 139 N.Y.L.J.
No. 63, p. 1, col. 8 (Sup. Ct. March 25, 1958), dealt with the problem of
whether a defendant in a criminal case has the absolte right to waive a jury
trial. Defendant who was indicted with five co-defendants was not allowed
to waive, apparently on the grounds that it would bring about a severance.
In a proceeding in the nature of prohibition and mandamus, the New York
Supreme Court held that the state constitutional requirement of "court approval"
concerns only the intelligence of the waiver. Where an intelligent waiver is
found, it must be allowed by the trial judge. Thus, a defendant in a non-
capital felony case may, by an intelligent waiver, indirectly obtain a severance
which is solely in the discretion of the trial judge.
I "The punishment of murder in the first degree shall be death by electro-
cution." D.C. CODE ANN. §22-2404 (1951).
2 "The punishment of murder in the second degree shall be imprisonment
for life, or for not less than twenty years." Ibid.
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viction,3 This view was adopted in United States v. Gibert,4 but
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ball "9
in so far as it related to the effect of defendant's appeal from a con-
viction. The latter held that acquittal of a defendant, competently
tried by a court having jurisdiction, is a bar to further prosecution
for the same offense. 6 This bar exists even if the acquittal be
erroneous. 7  However, this case also held that a defendant could be
tried again for the same offense when his conviction was reversed on
appeal." In Trono v. United States 9 defendant, indicted for murder
in the Philippine Islands,'0 was convicted of assault. On his appeal,
defendant was convicted of murder, and the Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction.
The Trono result was based on the theory that a defendant waives
all claims to former jeopardy by taking an appeal. 1 The majority in
the present case expressly rejected this rationale as too narrow an
application of the double jeopardy clause. 1 2  Moreover, in the spirit
of previous decisions that jeopardy may attach where a judgment 13
and even where a verdict 14 has not been rendered, the silence of the
verdict as to the higher offense is considered an implicit acquittal. 15
The dissent, using an historical test, relied on Trono as precedent. 16
The decision has enlarged the scope of double jeopardy in the
federal courts, while the waiver rationale, if extant, has been limited
to cases wherein defendant obtains a reversal, and thus subjects him-
self to a remand to trial for the sante offense. 17 The majority attempts
3 See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1873).
4 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1300 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834). But see United States v.
Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. 131 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846).
5 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
6 Id. at 671.
7 Ibid. See also Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 174 (1873).
8 See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896). For a similar result
in a state prosecution, see Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
9 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
10 Due to its Spanish heritage, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands,
at the time of both Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1903) and the
Trono case, had an appellate jurisdiction whereby it could decide questions of
law and fact and substitute its findings for those of the trial court.11 See Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 534 (1905).
12 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957). The Court also noted
chat Holmes' theory of single jeopardy (expressed in his dissenting opinion in
the Kepner case), in which the jeopardy initially attaching to proceedings con-
tinues until the defendant has been finally acquitted or convicted, ". . . has
never outwardly been adhered to by any other Justice of this Court." Id.
at 197.
13 See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
14 See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
15Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957). It is interesting to
note here that the Trono case involved an express acquittal of the higher
offense.
16 Id. at 206-19 (dissenting opinion).
17 To the effect that this is a limited waiver, see People v. Dowling, 84 N.Y.
478, 483-84 (1881).
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to harmonize this result with that of Trono, by confining the latter to
its peculiar Philippine jurisdictional facts."' However, the dissent's
contention that Trono has been overruled 19 appears correct.
In Kepner v. United States,20 defendant was tried and acquitted
in the Philippine Islands for embezzlement. The government ap-
pealed and secured a conviction. The Supreme Court reversed under
a construction of the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause, as
applied to the Philippine Islands by statute,2 ' which demonstrates that
the same body of law surrounding double jeopardy controlled these
two Philippine cases. Thus, Trono must have been decided under a
construction of traditional constitutional double jeopardy, and consis-
tency would require that it be overruled. The concept of an expand-
ing Constitution 2 2 would have been sufficient justification.
Furthermore, the majority describes the privilege against double
jeopardy as "a vital safeguard in our society." 23 This is language
reminiscent of the test of Palko v. Connecticut,2 4 which construed the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In that case, the
state prosecutor appealed, under Section 6494 of the Connecticut Gen-
eral Statutes, from a conviction of murder in the second degree. On
remand the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and
the Supreme Court affirmed. Would not this be double jeopardy in
the light of the language of the present case? And what of the con-
stitutionality of state law which permits such a result? 25
is Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 197 (1957). See note 10 supra.
19 d. at 198, 214 (dissenting opinion).
20 195 U.S. 100 (1903).
21 Id. at 123-25. The Court, in both Kepner and Trono, construed a statu-
tory provision of double jeopardy whose wording was based on the clause as
found in the Bill of Rights. The statute had been made applicable to the
Philippine Islands by the Act of July 1, 1902, 32 STAT. 691, 692.
Moreover, in the Trono case, the Court said of the issue involved: "We
may regard the question as thus presented as the same as if it arose in one
of the Federal courts in this country. .. ." Thus, necessarily, a construction
of the fifth amendment was involved. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521,
530 (1905).
22 This organic nature of the Constitution was early described in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 41'5 (1819), by this language: ".... [A]
constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs."
23 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957).
24302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). This case involved a prosecution appeal and
held that the protection of defendant from conviction of a higher offense on
remand was not within the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice"
secured by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. But how can
a right be considered "a vital safeguard in our society" and yet not come within
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice?"
See also Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910) (per curiam),, which
involved an appeal by defendant under similar facts but reached the same result.
25 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 8812 (1949) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2102 (1956) ;
OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.14 (1953). See also state law permitting varying de-
grees of double jeopardy as cited in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
216-18 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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Moreover, the Court's interpretation of the silence of the verdict,
as to first degree murder, as an "implicit acquittal" presents logical
problems. 26 All the Court knew from this silence was that the jury
did not convict of first degree murder. Yet this was treated as an
acquittal, which is a form of unanimous verdict ; 27 but the jury may
have merely disagreed on first degree murder. This is a form of
"'hung jury," 28 a situation which the prosecution may possibly verify
by the simple expedient of polling the jury,29 and which is traditionally
cured by a new trial.30
The underlying purpose of the privilege is protection from undue
governmental harassment.31 This, rather than speculation on the de-
liberations of the jury with all its attendant problems in logic, may
afford a sounder vehicle for this result.3 2
26 See, e.g., the following queries:
a. If a jury at a trial for first degree murder has been discharged for
failure to reach a verdict may they be recalled on the ground that a verdict on
first degree murder had been reached, disagreement existing only as to second
degree murder? If a poll of the jury then reveals an acquittal of first degree
murder, is further prosecution barred as to that offense? See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 4, 1958, p. 22, col. 4.
b. On a trial of a felony murder indictment when a jury has erroneously
been instructed on and convicts of second degree murder leading to a re-
versal, is the prosecution limited on remand to manslaughter in the commission
of a misdemeanor? If the felony does not include a misdemeanor is the de-
fendant immune from prosecution? This appears to be the situation in the
present case.
c. Where an indictment charges one crime committed in different ways
and the prosecution is compelled to elect to go to the jury on one count, on
a new trial may all the original counts be retried?
27 FFD. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). "A verdict must be unanimous."
2s Hung: sometimes applied to a jury which fails to agree on a verdict.
1 BouvimR, LAW DicroNARY (8th ed. 1914).
29 FED. R. CRim. P. 31(d). "When a verdict is returned and before it is
recorded the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or upon the court's
own motion. If upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury
may be directed to retire for further deliberations or may be discharged." It
would appear under this rule that a jury might possibly be polled as to a higher
offense on which their verdict was silent.
20Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135, 138 (1909).
31 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
32 The interpretation of silence as an "implicit acquittal" may logically lead
to the passage of a statute making it mandatory for a jury to state its verdict
on the higher offenses upon a conviction of a less offense. Such a statute
would be necessary to remove the doubt presently created. The lack of an
express acquittal under the statute would then make conviction of a higher
offense possible. As the Court placed its emphasis on acquittal, it would appear
to be of no consequence whether the prosecution or the defendant initiated the
action. However, such a result, contrary to the philosophy underlying double
jeopardy, would insure harassment.
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